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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final order of the district court 
granting summary judgment for the defendant trustee. The Utah 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Constitution Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court rule correctly that the 
challenged transfers were not void pursuant to § 25-1-11, the 
grantor-trust statute? 
2. Did the district court rule correctly as a matter of 
law and undisputed fact that the challenged transfers were not 
constructively fraudulent pursuant to § 25-1-4? 
3* Did the plaintiff TSL fail to raise the theory of 
"actual intent to defraud," § 25-1-7, at the trial court level 
or in the alternative, did the district court properly rule as a 
matter of law that the transfers were not actually fraudulent 
under § 25-1-7? 
4. Did the district court commit reversible error by the 
standards and burdens of proof it imposed under the Utah 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act? 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Resolution of the issues presented on appeal will be 
determined by construction of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
U.C.A., 1953 §§ 25-1-4, -7, -8 and -11, and Rule 56(e), Utah 
R.Civ.P., set out verbatim in the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a garnishment proceeding by Territorial Savings & 
Loan Association ("TSL") to enforce a Hawaii deficiency judgment 
against John N. Baird ("Baird") and his wife Joy K. Baird. In 
the context of the garnishment TSL sought, pursuant to the Utah 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, to set aside Baird's transfer of the 
Meadowview Convalescent Center ("Meadowview") to the KOA 
Irrevocable Trust. (R. 633, Tabs 1-4.) TSL filed a motion for 
summary judgment and the trustee filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. (R. 92-110, 137-72.) The district court denied TSL's 
motion and granted the trustee's motion, upholding the challenged 
transfer. (R. 432-37; Add. 1-6.) Thereafter TSL filed this 
appeal (R. 449). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant John Nelson Baird ("Baird") is a retired bank 
president who has been involved in a number of investments and 
business ventures. One of these was his purchase and leasing of 
the Meadowview Convalescent Center ("Meadowview") in Murray, 
Utah. (Affidavit of John Nelson Baird, R. 180-186, Add. 25. 26.) 
Since 1975 Baird borrowed over $240,000.00 in unsecured 
loans from six businessmen who were his friends (the "non-family 
creditors"). These loans were all evidenced by promissory notes 
executed at the time of the loans. Baird also borrowed 
$11,250.00 from his wife, Joy K. Baird, but did not evidence the 
loan by a promissory note executed at the time of the loan. 
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$1.69 million and had a monthly lease income of approximately 
$16,000.00. Also, at that time Meadowview was encumbered by two 
mortgages totaling approximately $1.2 million and had monthly 
mortgage payments of approximately $15,000.00. (Deposition of 
John Nelson Baird, at 21-22, and depo Exhibit 2, Sched. D.) 
Contemporaneous with the execution of the trust, Baird 
signed promissory notes to David Baird, John Knapp Baird, and Joy 
K. Baird (the "family creditors") evidencing Bairdfs debt for 
the services rendered by David and John Knapp, and the money 
loaned by Joy. (Deposition of John Nelson Baird, at 53 and depo 
Exhibit "3".) 
As consideration for the conveyance of Meadowview into 
trust, the trust assumed the obligations of Baird to the 
Meadowview mortgagees, to the non-family creditors, and to the 
family creditors. As additional consideration the trust agreed 
to pay Baird $30,000.00. The precise amounts of Baird1s 
obligations assumed by the trust were as follows: 
Mortgages on Meadowview $1,225,000.00 
Notes to the non-family creditors 
245,467.93 
(does not include accrued 
interest) 
Notes to the family creditors 136,250.00 
4 
Note payable to Baird 30,000,00 
TOTAL (excluding accrued interest) $1,621,717.931 
(Deposition of John Nelson Baird, Exhibit "1".) 
By its express terms, the trust completely divests Baird1s 
ownership and control over Meadowview and its income and gives 
full ownership and control to the trustee, John Knapp Baird. The 
trustee is required to use the trust income to pay the debts in 
the following priority: 
A. The Meadowview mortgages; 
B. The notes of the non-family creditors, the family 
creditors and Baird, in such amounts and at such times as the 
trustee in his discretion deems appropriate but not more than 
twenty years from the date of the trust; and 
C. If Baird himself pays or satisfies any portion of the 
debts assumed by the trust, then the trust is to reimburse Baird 
for such payments or satisfaction. (KOA Irrevocable Trust, R. 
212-213, Add. 9.) 
When all of the debts of the specified creditors are 
satisfied, the trustee may distribute income to Baird's children. 
The trustee has no discretion or power to pay to Baird trust 
income for his personal needs or wants. (KOA Irrevocable Trust, 
1
 The trust also assumed substantial accrued interest on 
the notes to the non-family creditors which brings the total 
value of the consideration given by the trust to over $1.7 
million. 
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R. 213-214, Add. 7-14.) 
For almost 2 years after the trust was created, the tenant 
of Meadowview continued to send its lease checks to Baird. Baird 
observed the trust formalities by endorsing all such checks over 
to the KOA Irrevocable Trust and mailing them to the trustee. 
After about 2 years, Baird requested that the Meadowview tenant 
make checks out directly to the trust and mail them to the 
trustee, which the tenant did. (Deposition of John Nelson Baird, 
at 72-76.) 
In the first month during the transition period immediately 
after the trust was created, Baird himself made one of the 
Meadowview mortgage payments and the trust reimbursed him for 
such payment in accordance with its terms. The trust has made 
all such payments since. (Deposition of John Nelson Baird, at 
142, 144-45.) 
Eventually, the Bairds were unable to make their payments to 
TSL, and TSL initiated foreclosure proceedings in October 1985, 
some sixteen months after the transfer of Meadowview to the 
Trust. As of June 1984, the appraised value of Baird's home, 
according to TSL, was $555,000.00, which was still more than the 
sum of the first and second mortgages. (Affidavit of Norman Mau, 
R. 326; affidavit of Vernon Hirata, R. 633 Tab 1.) At the 
foreclosure sale TSL bid only $385,000, which after paying the 
first mortgagor left a deficiency of $237,174.79. (Affidavit of 
Vernon Hirata, R. 633 Tab 1.) TSL obtained a Hawaii deficiency 
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judgment for that amount, and filed it in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
TSL served a writ of garnishment on the trustee seeking to 
garnish the lease payments from the Meadowview tenant to the 
trust. It is in the context of the garnishment that this action 
arises. 
In response to TSL's writ, the trustee answered that the 
trust only owed $2,000 to Baird, having previously paid $28,000 
on the $30,000 note to Baird. Pursuant to Rule 64D(i) , Utah 
R.Civ.P., TSL filed a reply which alleged that Baird's transfer 
of Meadowview to the trust violated the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, § 25-1-1 et seq. , and TSL sought to have the 
conveyance of Meadowview to the trust disregarded. 
TSL subsequently moved for summary judgment on its reply, 
and based its motion on three legal theories: 
1. The trust was void pursuant to § 25-1-11, the "grantor 
trust" statute; 
2. The trust was void pursuant to the common law because 
it preferred certain creditors over TSL; and 
3. The transfer was constructively fraudulent pursuant to 
U.C.A., 1953, §25-1-4, entitled "Conveyances by insolvent." 
(Transcript of proceedings, R. 664-665.) 
As part of its motion for summary judgment, TSL did not 
argue, as it does now on appeal, a legal theory based on the 
actual intent to defraud statute, U.C.A., 1953, § 25-1-7 and 25-
1-8. [See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
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Summary Judgment on Reply To Answers of Garnishee John Knapp 
Baird (hereafter "TSL's Original Memo"); R. 96, 99; Reply to 
Memorandum in Opposition to Judgment Creditors Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Trustees Motion for Summary 
Judgment (hereafter "TSL's Reply Memo"), R. 293-294; transcript 
of proceedings, R. 664-665.] Never, prior to this appeal, has 
TSL ever mentioned § 25-1-7 or otherwise raised the issue of 
actual fraud in its pleadings or argument. (See TSL's Original 
Memo R. 92-108; TSL's Reply Memo R. 292; and transcript of 
proceedings, R. 634-697.) 
The trustee responded to TSL's motion by way of a cross-
motion for summary judgment. The trustee asserted as an 
undisputed, material fact, supported by affidavits, that all of 
the debts assumed by the trust were good faith debts Baird had 
promised to repay. [Trustee's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Trustee' Motion for Summary judgment (hereafter "Trustees 
Original Memo") R. 148.] In opposition to defendants' motion, 
TSL filed its Reply Memo which did not begin with a statement of 
disputed material facts and which did not challenge or dispute 
the trustee's affidavits. Thus, the facts set forth in the 
trustee's Memorandum as "Undisputed Facts" are deemed admitted. 
(Rule 3 (h) of the Rules of Practice in the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah; Add. 97, 98). 
The trial court found that disputed issues of fact existed 
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as to TSL's motion and denied summary judgment for TSL. The 
court also found that no disputed issues of material fact existed 
as to the trustee's motion and granted summary judgment for the 
trustee. ("Order re: Summary Judgment" R. 432-437, Add. 1-6.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
TSL has raised four "issues presented on appeal" which are 
each addressed below. As an initial matter which relates to each 
of the issues, it must be assumed that the debts assumed by the 
KOA Irrevocable Trust were bona fide due to the failure of TSL to 
dispute this issue before the lower court. 
With respect to the first issue presented on appeal, the 
District Court properly ruled that, as a matter of law, the 
conveyance was not made for Baird's "use and benefit" under § 25-
1-11 because that statute is not applicable to transfers of 
interests in real property, and Baird did not retain the type of 
benefit contemplated by the statute. 
With respect to the second issue presented on appeal, the 
District Court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that the 
conveyance was not constructively fraudulent under §25-1-4 
because TSL is not a "creditor" within the meaning of that 
section and because the conveyance was clearly made for fair 
consideration. 
With respect to the third issue presented on appeal, the 
issue of whether the conveyance was actually fraudulent under §§ 
25-1-7 and 8 was never raised at any time in the proceedings 
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before the District Court, and therefore cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal. In any event, sufficient evidence was 
before the District Court to enable it to correctly rule as a 
matter of law that the conveyance was not actually fraudulent 
under U.C.A. §§ 25-1-7 and 8. 
With respect to the fourth issue presented on appeal, the 
District Court applied the proper standards and burdens of proof 
on each issue it addressed, and alternatively, any such error 
made by the District was not prejudicial. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment may be rendered when "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Utah R.Civ.P. 
Under the accepted rules of appellate review, this court will 
affirm the trial court's decision whenever it can do so on a 
proper ground, even though it was not the ground on which the 
trial court based its ruling. Bill Nay & Sons Excavating v. 
Neeley Construction Co.. 667 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) ; Alphin 
Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah 1979). It is evident in 
this case that, based on the undisputed facts and applicable law, 
the KOA Irrevocable Trust is a valid and enforceable trust and 
should be upheld. 
10 
POINT I 
The Bona Fide Nature of the Debts 
Assumed by the KOA Trust 
Was Not Disputed By TSL Before the Trial Court 
and Therefore Is Not Subject 
to Dispute on Appeal 
Before responding to the individual points argued by TSL on 
appeal, defendants wish to address an issue that overarches 
several of those points • This issue is that at the trial court 
level defendants filed affidavits showing the debts assumed by 
the KOA Trust were bona fide, and TSL did not file counter 
affidavits and did not otherwise dispute defendants' affidavits• 
TSL therefore should not be allowed to dispute this fact on 
appeal. 
Rule 56(e), Utah R.Civ.P., provides that where a party who 
moves for summary judgment supports his statement of undisputed 
facts by affidavit, the party opposing summary judgment may not 
rest on mere allegations or denials in his pleading. Instead the 
opposing party must file a response, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided, that sets forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. "If [the opposing party] does not so 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him." Id. 
This rule has been applied in numerous cases to uphold 
summary judgments where, as in this case, the party opposing 
summary judgment failed to dispute the facts below but then 
sought to dispute them on appeal. For example, in Cowen and Co. 
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v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984), plaintiff 
moved for summary judgment and filed a supporting affidavit that 
plaintiff was a "bona fide purchaser" of certain stock. The 
defendants did not proffer affidavits in opposition to the 
motion, did not challenge the sufficiency of plaintiff's 
affidavit, and did not otherwise raise the factual issue of 
plaintiff's bona fide purchaser status to the trial court. 
Summary judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and defendants 
appealed. This Court affirmed on the basis of Rule 56(e) and on 
the ground that defendants could not raise on appeal issues not 
raised before the trial court. 695 P.2d at 113-114. See also 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co. , 659 P.2d 1140 
(Utah 1983); A & M Enterprises, Inc. v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 
482 P.2d 700 (1971). 
In this case, the Trustee's Original Memo stated as an 
undisputed, material fact that "each of the obligations owed by 
Mr. Baird which were assumed by the Trust in consideration for 
the transfer of [Meadowview] were good faith debts owed by Mr. 
Baird which he promised to repay." (Trustee's Original Memo, R. 
148.) In support of this statement were attached the affidavits 
of Baird (R. 180-186, Add. 21-29), his sons David (R. 263-264, 
Add. 84, 85) and John Knapp (R. 244-245, Add. 89, 90), and his 
wife Joy. 2 (R. 265-266, Add. 91, 92.) Regarding the alleged 
2Portions of Baird's affidavit (R. 184) bear reproducing 
here, because they explain in detail how the debts to his family 
arose: 
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lack of documentation of Baird's debts to his sons and wife, it 
should be noted that when family members deal with a father, 
"they naturally [do] not deal at arm's length" but have faith in 
a father's intention "to eventually make it right with all of 
them." Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 963 (1960) 
(upholding father's conveyance to sons despite lack of 
documentation of debt due to them.) 
Before responding to the trustee's motion, TSL requested and 
received time in which to conduct additional discovery. 
Thereafter TSL filed its Reply Memo. TSL's Reply Memo did not 
attack the sufficiency or veracity of the affidavits filed by the 
trustee in support of his motion. TSL's Reply Memo was not 
33. The KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST has assumed my 
obligation to David Lincoln Baird in an amount equal to 
$50,000.00. This amount owing arose as a result of his 
services. Specifically, he served as a property 
manager and accountant for John Nelson Baird with 
respect to my properties in Honolulu, Hawaii. He also 
assisted me in preparing for the start-up of Lincoln 
Distributors, a food distribution company located in 
Honolulu, Hawaii. 
34. The KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST has assumed my 
obligation to Joy K. Baird, David Lincoln Baird, 
Randall P. Baird, in an amount equal to $11,250.00. 
This amount owing arose as a result of their interest 
in personal funds loaned to me by Joy K. Baird. These 
funds were held for the purpose of schooling, etc. 
35. The KOA IRREVOCABLE TRUST has assumed my 
obligation to John Knapp Baird in an amount equal to 
$75,000.00. This amount owing arose as a result of his 
services. Specifically, he acted as a property manager 
and attorney for me with respect to certain real 
property and other assets. 
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accompanied by any affidavits disputing the bona fide nature of 
the debts assumed by the KOA Trust. TSL's Reply Memo did not, as 
required by former Rule 2 (h) (now Rule 3 (h)) of the "Rules of 
Practice in the Third Judicial District Court of the State of 
Utah," begin with a section containing "a concise statement of 
material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue 
exists." (R. 292-327) Although the memo mentioned the close 
family relationship as a "badge of fraud," it did so in the 
context of a burden-shifting argument and never actually 
addressed the issue of whether the family debts were bona fide. 
(TSL!s Reply Memo R. 306-307.) 
Neither did TSL challenge, at the hearing on the cross-
motions for summary judgment, the testimony set forth in the 
affidavits or the portion of the Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts in the Trustee's Original Memo which established the bona 
fide nature of the family debt. (Transcript, R. 834-898.) 
In short, the trustee asserted by affidavit that the debts 
assumed by the trust were bona fide, and TSL did not file counter 
affidavits or otherwise challenge the trustee's affidavits and 
assertions on this issue. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 56(e), 
Utah R.Civ.P., and Rule 3(h) of the Rules of Practice in the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah, the facts set 
forth in the Statement of Undisputed Facts in the Trustee's 
Original Memo are deemed admitted, and TSL can not now dispute 
this fact on appeal in an attempt to create an issue of material 
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fact requiring a remand to the trial court. As will be seen 
below, the bona fide nature of the debts assumed by the trust 
relates to several of TSL's arguments on appeal. 
POINT II 
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That 
Baird's Transfers to the KOA Trust Are Not 
Void Pursuant to S 25-1-11 the Grantor-Trust Statute 
TSL argued to the trial court and argues in its Point I on 
appeal that Baird's transfer of Meadowview to the KOA 
Irrevocable Trust was void pursuant to the grantor-trust statute, 
U.C.A. § 25-1-11 (1953). The trial court correctly ruled as a 
matter of law that § 25-1-11 does not void the transfer. This 
ruling is correct because (a) that statute does not apply to 
transfers of real property, and (b) the KOA Irrevocable Trust is 
not "for the use of" defendant Baird. 
A. The Grantor-Trust Statute Does Not Apply to 
Transfers of Real Property. 
The grantor-trust statute, § 25-1-11, provides: 
All deeds, gifts, conveyances, transfers, or 
assignments, verbal or written, of goods, chattels, or 
things in action made in trust for the use of the 
person making the same shall be void as against the 
existing or subsequent creditors of such person. 
[Emphasis added.] 
The emphasized language, which TSL has ellipsed out in its own 
brief (p. 8 thereof), expressly provides that the statute applies 
only to transfers of personal property, and not real property. 
This Court has so interpreted that language in Geary v. Cain. 79 
Utah 268, 9 P.2d 396, 398-399 (1932). "[The statute] relates 
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only to 'goods, chattels, or things in action, • which in any 
sense of the terms are not real property." 9 P.2d at 399. 
Accordingly, Baird's transfer of Meadowview, which is real 
property, does not fall within the scope of the statute. 
Furthermore, even if § 25-1-11 did apply to the Meadowview 
conveyance, that section is still not applicable to the KOA 
Irrevocable Trust, as discussed below. 
B. The KOA Trust is Not "For the Use of" Defendant 
Baird. 
The KOA Irrevocable Trust is not the type of trust that § 
25-1-11 was intended to invalidate. Section 25-1-11, quoted in 
full above, invalidates trusts only if they are "for the use of" 
the grantor. The KOA Irrevocable Trust is not for the use of its 
grantor, Baird, because the purpose of the trust is to pay 
Baird's creditors. TSL argues that the KOA trust is for Baird's 
use and benefit because in exchange for the trust property, the 
trust assumed the debts of Baird and agreed to pay Baird an 
additional $30,000 as part consideration. TSL has cited no 
authority whatsoever for its proposition that the assumption of 
the grantor's debts or the payment of consideration by a trust 
renders a trust "for the use of" the grantor within the meaning 
of the statute, and clearly that is not the law. The trust 
actually benefits Baird's creditors, not Mr. Baird. Baird has 
not reserved any power of revocation or control over the trust; 
Baird has not insulated from creditors any trust payments he 
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receives; and the only benefit he received by creating the trust 
was the consideration given by the trust (i.e., assumption of 
Baird's debts and $30,000 note to Baird) in exchange for the 
trust's only asset, Meadowview. 
A case directly on point is Wagner v. United States, 573 
F.2d 447, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1978). In Wagner the grantor created 
a trust to which he assigned $500.00 per month of his wages and 
commissions. The purpose of the trust was to pay one of the 
grantor's unsecured creditors. The Internal Revenue Service, 
also a creditor of the grantor, sought to void the assignments on 
the basis of Indiana's grantor-trust statute, which is nearly 
identical to Utah's grantor-trust statute. The court held that 
since the trust funds were to be used to pay the grantor's debts, 
those funds were not "for the use of" the grantor. 
The foregoing interpretation of "for the use of" is also 
supported by the leading Utah case of Leach v. Anderson. 535 P.2d 
1241 (Utah 1975). Leach contains a prime example of the type of 
trust §25-1-11 was intended to invalidate. In Leach, Norma 
Anderson, the judgment debtor, was both grantor and beneficiary 
of a trust which was entirely committed to maintain her 
lifestyle. The trustee was empowered to pay to Norma Anderson 
such portions of the trust as were necessary to maintain her 
standard of living; purchase for her a new automobile every two 
or three years; provide vacations for her; provide her sufficient 
funds to maintain her home; and provide her other living 
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accommodations according to her needs. The terms of the trust 
also granted her continued powers and privileges concerning the 
ownership and control over portions of the trust res. 
Significantly, the trust contained a spendthrift clause providing 
that no payments from the trust to Anderson were liable to legal 
process by Anderson's creditors. 
Anderson's judgment creditor sued under § 25-1-11 to satisfy 
his judgment debt of $13,795.67 against the trust assets, which 
included very substantial personal property. The trial court 
ruled for the judgment creditor, and this Court affirmed. The 
Court explained that § 25-1-11 applies only to trusts in which 
the grantor can "enjoy substantially all the advantages of 
ownership" and at the same time place his property beyond the 
legitimate claims of creditors. 535 P. 2d at 1243. The Court 
emphasized that the statute was not intended to limit "other 
traditional and beneficial uses" of trusts, including, as in the 
instant case, irrevocable trusts. Id. The Court reasoned that 
because the entire aim of the trust was to support Norma 
Anderson, the trust was in essence for her use and benefit. Id. 
at 1243-44. 
The KOA Irrevocable Trust is very different from the trust 
in Leach v. Anderson, for these reasons: 
1. Unlike Leach, the KOA Trust has no provisions for the 
support and maintenance of Baird. The only payments Baird is 
entitled to from the trust are $30,000 in part consideration for 
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Meadowview, and reimbursement to Baird in direct proportion to 
any payments or satisfaction by Baird of the debts assumed by the 
trust. 
2. In Leach the "entire trust res, income and principal" 
was committed to maintain the lifestyle of Norma Anderson. The 
KOA Trust, in contrast, has committed its entire trust asset of 
$1.7 million to pay Baird"s creditors, except for payment of the 
$30,000 note to Baird as part consideration for transfer of 
Meadowview to the trust. 
3. In Leach the spendthrift provision prevented creditors 
from garnishing or attaching any amounts due to Norma Anderson. 
535 P. 2d at 1243. In contrast, the KOA Trust has no such 
provision with respect to Baird and makes no attempt to insulate 
any payments to Baird from creditors. 
4. Unlike the grantor in Leach, Baird has retained no 
beneficial interest in the property whatsoever. The Trust is 
completely irrevocable and Baird has no discretion over 
distribution of proceeds or property under the Trust. 
Certainly the KOA Irrevocable Trust is not the type of trust 
contemplated by § 25-1-11 and the case law which invalidates 
grantor trusts. The alleged benefit retained by Baird is not 
even the reservation of an interest, but is merely fair 
consideration exchanged to the grantor at the time of the 
grantorfs transfer of the trust property into the trust. See, 
e.g., Eskelson v. Inter-County Title Guaranty & Mortgage Co.. 207 
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N.Y.S.2d 27 (1960) (assumption of mortgage debt is fair 
consideration for conveyance of real property) . Under 
plaintiff's argument, a grantor of property to a trust could not 
receive anything, let alone fair consideration, in exchange for 
the trust property without the trust being rendered invalid 
pursuant to § 25-1-11. But if the grantor did transfer property 
in trust without receiving fair consideration in exchange, the 
transfer would be in danger of being voided pursuant to § 2 5-1-4 
for lack of fair consideration. (See discussion of § 25-1-4, 
Point III.B., infra.) Obviously the receipt of consideration by 
the grantor is not the type of benefit prohibited by § 25-1-11. 
TSL argues that Baird has benefitted because, by preferring 
the trust creditors, Baird is judgment proof as to other 
creditors. However, Utah law is well-settled that it is entirely 
permissible for a debtor to prefer one creditor over another, 
even if the debtor is insolvent, so long as the debt is bona 
fide. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1261 (Utah 1987); 
Commercial National Bank v. Page & Brinton, 45 Utah 14, 27, 142 
P. 709, 714 (1914). As discussed in Point I, supra. TSL did not 
dispute at the trial level the bona fide nature of the debts 
assumed by the KOA Irrevocable Trust. In addition, the mere fact 
that some of the preferred creditors are close relatives makes no 
difference. See, e.g. , Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 131 Utah 2d 
173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962) (upholding preference from son to father 
where pre-existing debt was showed to be bona fide)• 
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TSL argues that a trust to prefer creditors is invalid if 
the grantor reserves any benefit whatsoever to himself. This is 
clearly not the law. As a general proposition of law, a trust is 
not void in its entirety merely because the grantor reserves some 
small or incidental benefits to himself. In re Borne's Will, 158 
N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1012-1013 (1957); Liberty Storage & Warehouse Co. 
v. VanWyck, 256 A.D. 641, 11 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1930); 37 C.J.S. 
Fraudulent Conveyances § 219 (1943). Benefits which a grantor 
may reserve that do not invalidate the trust include the right to 
repurchase trust property on satisfaction of indebtedness; the 
right to surplus proceeds after payment of the debt secured; the 
right to direct the direction of surplus proceeds; and rights 
which, whether expressed or not, the law would confer anyway on 
the grantor. 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances at §§ 218, 224, 
225. 
In this case the alleged benefits received by Baird were not 
"reserved" by him but were given as consideration by the Trust 
for the property at the time of transfer. The alleged "benefit" 
to Baird from the right to reimbursement from the trust if Baird 
pays a portion of the debts assumed by the trust is not a benefit 
at all inasmuch as he receives nothing from such a transaction, 
but is simply reimbursed for any expenditures made in payment of 
trust obligations. Furthermore, Baird would have had the right 
to such reimbursement regardless of whether it had been expressly 
reserved in the trust. 
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The cases cited by TSL are not to the contrary. Both Bank 
of Cave Spring v. Gold Kist, Inc., 173 Ga. App. 679, 327 S.E.2d 
800 (1985) and Nelson v. Hansen, 278 Or. 571, 565 P.2d 727 
(1977), uphold the validity of the trusts in question. Hoppe 
Hardware Co. v. Bain, 21 Okla. 177, 95 P. 765 (1908), is 
distinguishable, in that there the debtor reserved very 
substantial benefits: the debtor had complete control over the 
transferred assets (he placed them in a corporation and made 
himself president and general manager) and he reserved himself a 
profitable salary from the assets. Here, Baird has relinquished 
control and has no right to further payments from the trust, 
except the reimbursement already discussed and distinguished. 
TSL argues that Baird retains and enjoys substantially all 
previous advantages of ownership while at the same time placing 
the property out of the reach of creditors. But Baird has 
clearly given up all his previous advantages of ownership, since 
he can no longer use the Meadowview income or any portion of it 
for his personal use and because he no longer has any control 
over the disposition of such income or property. And to the 
extent that he does receive any payments from the trust, those 
can be reached by creditors. 
In sum, the KOA Irrevocable Trust is a valid trust for the 
benefit of creditors. It is different in all significant 
respects from the trust in Leach, is not the type of trust § 25-
1-11 was intended to prevent, and § 25-1-11 applies only to 
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personal property. 
POINT III 
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled 
That the Transfers to the Trust 
Do Not Violate S 25-1-4 
TSL argued to the trial court and argues as its Point II on 
appeal that the transfer of Meadowview to the KOA Trust was 
constructively fraudulent pursuant to U.C.A., § 25-1-4 (1953). 
The trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law that TSL 
failed to prove all three elements of § 25-1-4. 
Section 25-1-4 provides: 
Every conveyance made, and every obligation 
incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby 
rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, 
without regard to actual intent, if the conveyance is 
made or the obligation is incurred without a fair 
consideration. 
As TSL acknowledges in its brief, it cannot prevail under § 
25-1-4 unless it proves by clear and convincing evidence all 
three of the following elements: (1) TSL was a creditor of 
Baird; (2) Baird was insolvent or was rendered insolvent by the 
conveyance, and (3) the conveyance was made without fair 
consideration. Furniture Manufacturers Sales, Inc. v. Deamerf 
680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984). If TSL fails to prove even one of 
these elements, its claim under §25-1-4 must fail. Id. The 
undisputed facts show that TSL failed to prove element (1), TSL's 
creditor status, and element (3), lack of fair consideration. 
Material issues of fact were left unresolved with respect to 
element (2), Baird's insolvency, due to the conflicting 
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affidavits filed by both sides regarding this issue• TSL spends 
several pages in its brief reviewing the evidence it presented on 
this issue but completely ignores the extensive and competent 
evidence introduce by Baird on this issue. This is immaterial to 
this case, however, inasmuch as TSL has clearly failed to 
establish the other two elements. 
A. TSLfs Creditor Status 
By its terms, § 25-1-4 only applies to persons who are 
creditors at the time of the conveyance. In contrast, other 
sections of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act speak of "both present 
and future creditors." §§ 25-1-6, 25-1-7 (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that at the time Baird conveyed Meadowview 
to the KOA Irrevocable Trust, TSL was fully secured. Furthermore, 
at the time TSL sold and purchased the property at the 
foreclosure sale it was still fully secured. The property was 
appraised at $555,000.00 as of the date of the transfer, more 
than enough value to cover both the first and second mortgages. 
(Affidavit of Norman Mau, R. 326.) The deficiency resulted when 
TSL purchased the property at its own foreclosure sale for 
$385,000.00. (Affidavit of Vernon Hirata R. 663 Tab 1.) 
Accordingly, TSL should not be allowed to assert its creditor 
status even though the security later proved insufficient. 
The foregoing argument finds support in McMillan v. 
McMillan, 245 P. 98 (Idaho 1926). In McMillan the creditor was 
fully secured by a mortgage on certain real property of the 
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debtor at the time the debtor made a gift of other real property 
to his wife. The creditor foreclosed on the mortgage, bought at 
the foreclosure sale for less than the debt, obtained a 
deficiency judgment, and then sought to execute on the wife's 
real property to satisfy the deficiency. The Idaho Supreme Court 
held that because the creditor was fully secured he was not the 
type of "creditor" fraudulent conveyance laws were intended to 
protect and therefore, the debtor's conveyance was not 
fraudulent. The court stated; 
[I]t must be kept in mind that this action is by a 
secured creditor, one who held mortgage security for 
the payment of his debt. The transfer in no way 
endangered the mortgage security. The creditor neither 
alleged nor proved that the mortgaged property was not 
of sufficient value to pay the debt when...the gift was 
made to [the debtor's wife]....The transfer was not 
fraudulent, if the husband had sufficient remaining 
property to pay his debt, and [the wife] was under no 
necessity at trial to prove that [the husband's] 
property was sufficient, when the gift was made, to pay 
the debt, in the absence of evidence on behalf of [the 
creditor] that the property mortgaged to secure the 
payment of the debt was not sufficient for that 
purpose. 
245 P. at 99. 
The cases cited by TSL in part II.A. of its brief are not to 
the contrary. In Furniture Manufacturers Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 
680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984), the creditor was unsecured. In Meyer 
v. General American Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), "there was 
no dispute in the lower court" as to the creditor's status. 569 
P.2d at 1096. And in Qqden State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 
P. 765 (1895) the Fraudulent Conveyance Act had not yet been 
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enacted; the issue of the creditor's status was not discussed; 
and the value of the security was not mentioned. 
Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling on the basis of TSL's fully secured status at the time of 
the conveyance, 
B, Lack of Fair Consideration 
The trial court's ruling is also supported by the 
undisputed fact that Baird's conveyance into trust was made for 
fair consideration: the trust assumed approximately $1.7 million 
of Baird's debt in exchange for a property valued at 
approximately $1.7 million. It is absolutely essential that TSL 
establish that the conveyance was made without fair consideration 
for the conveyance to be set aside as fraudulent. Furniture 
Manufacture Sales Inc., v Deamer. 680 P.2d at 400 n.ll. This TSL 
has not done. 
Fair consideration, as defined by § 25-1-3, requires that 
the exchange be (1) a "fair equivalent" and (2) "in good faith." 
See Meyer v. General American Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah 
1977) . TSL failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that 
either of these elements was lacking. 
1. Fair Equivalent Exchange 
It is widely held that assumption of the 
grantor's bona fide debts by the grantee constitutes a valuable 
and sufficient consideration for the conveyance of the grantor's 
property. 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Conveyances § 22 (1968) . 
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Moreover, it is widely held that the grantee's assumption of a 
mortgage on the property transferred is fair consideration for 
the transfer. E.g.. Peterson v. Wilson, 88 Cal.App. 2d 617, 199 
P. 2d 757, 7523 (1948) (sister's assumption of brother's 
mortgage); Matusik V. Large, 85 Nev. 202, 452 P.2d 457 (1969); 
Eskelson v. Inter-County Title Guaranty & Mortgage Co. , 207 
N.Y.S. 2d (1960) (wife's assumption of husband's mortgage). 
Thus, the only issue in this case is whether the value of the 
debts assumed by the KOA Trust were a "fair equivalent" of the 
value of Meadowview. 
Utah law is well settled that "fair equivalent" does not 
mean "exact equivalent." Utah Assets Corp v. Dooley Bros. 
Association. 92 Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738, 741 (1937). Consideration 
is sufficiently equivalent if it is not "an unreasonably small 
proportion" of the property transferred. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. 
White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962). Transfers that 
have been held so disproportionately small as to not be a fair 
equivalent include paying 10% of the value of equipment, Meyer v. 
General American Corp. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), and paying 13% 
of a property's proven worth, id. at 1097 (citing First Security 
Bank v. Vrontikis, 26 Utah 2d 422, 490 P.2d 1301 (1971). On the 
other hand, in Utah Assets Corp v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92 Utah 
577, 70 P. 2d 738 (1937) this Court upheld the conveyance of 
property worth about $14,000 to $15,000 to satisfy a debt of 
$10,000. Thus, the proportion of debt to the property 
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transferred in that case was 67%-71%. 
In the instant case, TSL concedes on page 16 of its brief 
that the appraised value of Meadowview was numerically equivalent 
to the value of the debts assumed by the trust. TSL states: 
"The parties agree that [Meadowview] had a fair market value of 
approximately $1.7 million. As purported consideration the 
Trustee assumed the mortgage liability of $1.2 million and 
'debts1 to Baird, his family and friends of $.5 million." 
Appellant's Brief, at 16. 
As discussed in Point I. supra, TSL did not dispute at the 
trial court level the bona fide nature of the debts assumed by 
the trust. TSL may not now raise this as a factual issue on 
appeal, and accordingly a fair equivalence existed at the time of 
transfer. 
Furthermore, even if the family debts are not counted, the 
remaining debts assumed (approximately $1,535,750, using TSL's 
figures) are 90% of the value of Meadowview. Such a figure is 
not disproportionately small when compared to figures in the Utah 
cases just discussed. It is not "so manifestly inadequate as to 
shock the moral sense and create in the mind at once, upon its 
being mentioned, a suspicion of fraud." Utah Assets Corp. v. 
Doolev Bros Ass'n. supra, 70 P.2d at 742. Accord Peterson v. 
Wilson. 88 Cal. App. 2d 617, 199 P.2d 757, 763 (1948) (disparity 
between the value of the property and the debt assumed must show 
"gross inadequacy of consideration"). 
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Furthermore, the mortgages alone equal 80% of the value of 
Meadowview, which is a higher proportion than in Utah Assets 
Corp, v, Dooley Bros, supra, and is still a fair equivalent. 
Compare In re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434, 442-448 (Bankr. Utah 1982) 
(70% is reasonably equivalent). 
TSL argues that the entire transaction must be subject to 
rigid scrutiny because the trustee of the KOA Trust is Baird's 
son and three of the twelve Trust creditor's are close family. 
In Utah, as elsewhere, although transactions between family 
members are subject to close scrutiny, "that fact alone does not 
render the conveyance fraudulent." Ned J. Bowman Co. v. Whitef 
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962). In numerous Utah 
cases, transfers between close relatives have been upheld as not 
being fraudulent conveyances. See Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White. 
supra (son's transfer to father); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 
287, 351 P.2d 959 (1969) (father's transfer to sons); Lund v. 
Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937) (husband's transfer to 
wife); Road Runner Inn, Inc. v. Merrill, 605 P.2d 776 (Utah 1980) 
(husband's transfer to wife); Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley 
Brothers Association, 92 Utah 557, 70 P.2d 738 (1937) (family 
corporation's transfer to family member); Boccalero v. Bee, 102 
Utah 12, 1226 P.2d 1063 (1942) (brother's transfer to sister). 
Under even close scrutiny the KOA Irrevocable Trust is seen 
to be a bona fide trust for the purpose of securing creditors. 
For two years after the challenged conveyance the Meadowview 
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lessee made lease payments to Baird, who in turn endorsed the 
payment checks over to the KOA Irrevocable Trust and sent them to 
the trustee, (Deposition of John Nelson Baird, at 72-76.) The 
KOA Trust made all of the payments on the assigned mortgage debts 
except for the first payment made by Baird during the transition 
when the trust took over the mortgage payments, and this payment 
was reimbursed to Mr. Baird by the Trust. (Deposition of John 
Nelson Baird, at 142, 144-145.) Under the terms of the trust the 
trustee has 20 years from the date the trust is instituted to 
satisfy the various debts to the specified creditors. Presently 
the obligations to the non-family creditors have not yet been 
paid. But as the value of Meadowview appreciates over time and 
the mortgages are paid down, sufficient equity will exist in 
Meadowview to pay all of the specified creditors upon the sale or 
refinancing of Meadowview. Accordingly, the fact that none of 
the non-family creditors have yet been paid is not any evidence 
that they will never be paid or that the trust does not intend to 
carry out its express purpose, which is to secure and otherwise 
provide "for the payment of certain obligations of the trustor.11 
(KOA Irrevocable Trust Agreement, R. 211-212, Add. 7.) 
TSL argues that there was never any expectation or promise 
of payment of Baird's family members for the services they 
rendered. TSL misstates the record in this respect as the 
question of expectation or promise was never posed to Baird on 
the deposition pages cited by TSL and therefore it cannot be said 
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that there was no expectation or promise of payment. (Deposition 
of John Nelson Baird, at 42-52.) 
TSL argues that because no record was kept of the family 
debts, they are not valid. However, recognizing the atmosphere 
of trust and informality inherent in intra-family transactions, 
this Court has upheld a transfer from a parent to family members 
for services rendered despite the fact that no record was kept. 
Givan v. Lambeth. 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959 (1960). 
2. Good Faith 
Although the words "in good faith" are used in the 
definition of fair consideration found in § 25-1-3, it is clear 
from the case law that the key to determining fair consideration 
is the "fair equivalent" element discussed above. TSL has not 
cited a single case where a conveyance was held to be without 
fair consideration where, as in this case, the consideration 
given was numerically equivalent to the property transferred. 
However, inasmuch as TSL went to great lengths in its brief to 
show the lack of good faith surrounding this transfer, some space 
will be devoted to it here. 
The trial court properly found as a matter of law that the 
transfer of Meadowview to the KOA Trust was made in "good faith." 
This term, although not defined in the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 
has elsewhere been defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or 
transaction concerned," U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-1-201(19), and 
"honesty of purpose and integrity of conduct with respect to a 
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given subject." Smith v. Whitman, 189 A.2d 15, 19 (N.J. 1963). 
As mentioned above, TSL has the burden of proving lack of good 
faith by clear and convincing evidence. Furniture Manufacturers 
Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1984). 
The purpose of the disputed transfer was not dishonest: it 
was to provide for payment to and give preference to Baird !s 
unsecured creditors. Regarding preferences, this court has held 
that an intent to prefer one's creditors does not support the 
conclusion that the transfer lacks good faith. Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1261 (Utah 1987). Surely TSL cannot 
claim Baird acted in bad faith in setting up the Trust to provide 
security for payment of debts owing to his unsecured creditors 
when TSL has at all times been fully secured and when its 
deficiency judgment against Mr. Baird is solely a result of TSL 
purchasing the property for significantly less than its appraised 
value at its own foreclosure sale. Had the foreclosure taken 
place in Utah rather than Hawaii, TSL would likely not be 
entitled to any deficiency inasmuch as Baird would have been 
credited with the fair market value of the home on the date of 
the foreclosure sale, rather than only $385,000. (See U.C.A. § 
57-1-32 (1953 as amended.) 
TSL argues that several indicia of fraud in this case 
require a finding of bad faith. These alleged indicia include: 
(1) no fair equivalence was exchanged; (2) the trust prefers the 
trust creditors over other creditors; (3) the purported 
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consideration (Baird's debts) was falsely created to give 
appearance of exchange; (4) the trust benefits Baird; (5) three 
of the creditors are close family members, and the trustee is 
Baird's son; (6) Baird ignored the trust; (7) Meadowview was 
Baird's most valuable asset; (8) there was current and impending 
litigation, with creditors in pursuit; (9) the trust was kept 
secret; (10) the failure of the trust to file tax returns; and 
(11) other miscellaneous indicia, including Baird's insolvency, 
lack of adequate record keeping, the trust's inability to pay 
trust debts, lack of payments to specified, non-family creditors. 
Based on the undisputed facts and applicable law, the trial 
court properly found that the above items are either not valid 
indicia of bad faith or are not clear and convincing evidence of 
bad faith, as follows. (1) As discussed in Point III.B.l., 
supra, a fair equivalent exchange existed here. (2) As discussed 
in this subpoint, intent to prefer legitimate creditors does not 
support the conclusion of lack of good faith. (3) As discussed 
in Point I, supra, TSL failed to dispute at the trial court level 
the bona fide nature of Baird's debts, and is therefore precluded 
from doing so on appeal, and the debts were in fact bona fide. 
(4) As discussed in Point II, supra, the trust does not benefit 
Baird, but rather his unsecured creditors. (5) As previously 
discussed, the mere fact that transferees are family members does 
not invalidate the trust; it must be coupled with other factors 
such as lack of fair consideration to be an indicia of fraud. 
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Furthermore, the benefit to family members constitutes only about 
10% of the value of Meadowview. (6) As discussed in Point 
III.B.l, supra. Baird did not ignore the trust, but in fact 
endorsed lease payments to the trustee and mailed them to him. 
(7) The only asset transferred was Meadowview; thus this case is 
unlike cases where the debtor transfers all his assets. (8) 
There was no current or immediately impending litigation, since 
the trust was created 16 months before TSL initiated foreclosure 
proceedings on the Baird's home. (9) The transaction itself has 
not been kept secret. The conveyance into trust was immediately 
recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder and made a matter of 
public record. (10) Tax returns have not been filed for the 
trust because the records necessary to prepare such returns are 
in Honolulu with Mr. Baird's accountant. There are some disputes 
concerning Mr. Baird's personal taxes which involve the transfer 
of the property to the trust. Due to these disputes several 
extensions have been filed and the records have been unavailable 
for use in preparing the trust returns. (11) The remaining 
indicia are not sufficient to show clearly and convincingly a 
lack of good faith. 
Furthermore, balanced against the alleged indicia or bad 
faith are numerous indicia of good faith supporting the trial 
court's ruling. These include: 
1. There is nothing unusual about the establishment of 
this trust, as it is a common method of providing for payment of 
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financial obligations; 
2. Baird retained no beneficial interest whatsoever or 
lingering strings of control over the trust; 
3. The trust instrument does not insulate the trust 
payments to Baird from Baird1s creditors; 
4. The expressed intent of the trust was to benefit 
Baird's creditors; 
5. The actual effect of the trust is to provide security 
for and a method of payment to the specified creditors which 
constitute the totality of Baird's unsecured creditors (TSL is 
among the secured creditors); and 
6. The value of the debts assumed by the trust is 
numerically equivalent to the value of Meadowview at the time of 
the transfer to the trust. 
One of the cases cited by TSL, Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 
287, 351 P.2d 959 (I960), supports defendants' position. The 
debtor was a sheep rancher who in 1952 borrowed money to purchase 
an automobile sales business. For several years prior to 1952, 
the debtor's sheep ranching operation had been run by his four 
sons. No actual contract between the sons and the father was 
ever written or agreed upon and no definite records were kept of 
the amounts due them for their services. The sons had only the 
ordinary expectation of eventually participating in their 
father's business. In September 1952 the father conveyed the 
sheep and the sheep ranch to his sons; he also conveyed his house 
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to all his children. These conveyances were not recorded until 
May of 1953. During that same month, creditors started suing the 
automobile sales business, which was forced out of business 
before the end of 1953. 
The creditors of the father sought to set aside the 
conveyance of the sheep ranch to his sons. The conveyance was 
upheld despite the following "indicia of fraud" as alleged by 
TSL: 
1. A close family relationship between the transferor and 
transferees; 
2. No actual contract of employment between the father 
and the sons and no records kept of the exact amount due the 
sons; 
3. Secrecy, i.e., a delay in recording the conveyance 
from the father to the sons; 
4. Conveyance of the debtor's most valuable assets for 
the benefit of his family, to the exclusion of other creditors; 
5. Current and impending litigation against the father 
with creditors in pursuit; 
6. Conveyance of the father's home to all of his children 
without any material consideration whatsoever. 
In upholding the conveyance, this Court pointed to a number 
of factors that can be considered indicia of good faith. In 
response to the charge that there was no specific contract nor 
debt due the sons, this Court mentioned defendants' rejoinder 
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that the sons naturally did not deal at arms length with their 
father but had faith in his intention eventually to make it right 
with all of them. In response to the charge that the house was 
conveyed without any consideration, this Court stated that "it is 
elementary that the love and affection that a father has for his 
children is sufficient consideration to support a conveyance, 
absent fraud." 351 P.2d at 963. The Court also pointed out that 
the creditors of the father, who had originally sold him the 
automobile business, were secured and that this fact, as much as 
any, supported the trial court's determination. Id. 
The other Utah cases cited by TSL are not to the contrary. 
In Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942), and Lund 
v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937), the conveyances were 
held as not being fraudulent despite badges of fraud present in 
both those cases. In none of the remaining cases in which lack 
of fair consideration was found was the value of the 
consideration given numerically equivalent to the property 
transferred, as in this case. For example in Meyer v. General 
American Corp.. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), the major basis for 
finding the transfer to be in bad faith was that the transferee 
gave only one-tenth the value of the property transferred. This 
court pointed to other indicia of fraud merely as further support 
for the trial court's finding of lack of good faith. 569 P.2d at 
1097. And in Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P. 2d 420 (Utah 
1986)# the issue of good faith was not even addressed. 
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In sum, the undisputed circumstances of this case adequately 
support the trial court's determination that TSL failed to prove 
lack of good faith or lack of fair consideration, 
POINT IV 
TSL Did Not Raise the 
"Actual Intent to Defraud" Theory 
at the Trial Court Level 
and Should Therefore Be Precluded 
from Raising It on Appeal 
TSL argues for the first time on appeal that Baird's 
transfers to the KOA Irrevocable Trust violate §§ 25-1-7 and 25-
1-8 of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, which are based on 
actual (as distinguished from constructive) intent to defraud 
creditors. TSL had ample opportunity to raise this theory before 
the trial court, but chose not to. Therefore, TSL should be 
precluded from raising it on appeal. 
One of the most fundamental, axiomatic rules of appellate 
review is that this Court will not consider on appeal matters 
neither raised in the pleadings nor presented to the trial court. 
E.g. , Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co. , 659 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1984); Obradovich v. Walker Brothers, 80 Utah 587, 16 
P.2d 212 (1932). The reasons for this rule are both theoretical 
and practical. As a matter of legal theory, the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing the case made in the court 
below, and therefore this Court will not consider questions not 
heard or determined by the trial court. United States Building & 
Loan Association v. Midvale Home Finance Corp. , 86 Utah 522, 46 
38 
P.2d 672, 673 (1935), denying rehearing of 86 Utah 506, 44 P.2d 
1090. As a practical matter, orderly civil procedure requires 
that a party present all his theories of recovery to the trial 
court. Having done so, he cannot thereafter change to some 
different theory and thus attempt to keep in motion a "merry-go-
round of litigation." Bundy v. Century Equipment Co.. 692 Utah 
754, 758 (1984) (quoting Simpson v. General Motors., 24 Utah 2d 
301, 303, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970)). 
For example, in Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 
301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970), the plaintiff submitted the case to the 
jury on negligence, and this Court refused an appeal to consider 
plaintiff's contentions relating to strict liability. In Davis v. 
Mulholland, 24 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970), the plaintiff 
claimed mutual mistake of fact at the trial court level, and this 
Court refused to consider on appeal plaintiff's claim of 
unilateral mistake of fact. 
In this case, TSL had ample opportunity in its pleadings and 
at the hearing to present a theory based on § 25-1-7 or 25-1-8, 
but failed to do so. To the contrary, the issue of factual fraud 
or actual intent to defraud creditors under U.C.A. §§ 25-1-7 and 
25-1-8 was never raised in any pleading, memorandum, during oral 
argument or at any other time in the proceedings. In fact, TSL 
made it clear that it was not asserting an actual intent theory; 
one of TSL's sub-points in its Original Memo is entitled "Mr. 
Baird's Actual Intent to Defraud TSL Need Not Be Proven" and 
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states in pertinent part: 
Under the Act, Mr. Baird's actual intent to defraud TSL 
is not an element of the claim. Summary judgment 
should be granted on the basis of the Trust documents, 
the trustee's testimony and other uncontradicted 
evidence that (1) Mr. Baird's conveyance to the Trust 
was made while he was indebted to TSL and others; (2) 
Mr. Baird is insolvent (i.e., that he was and is 
heavily indebted and that TSL has been unable to 
collect its judgment) and (3) Mr. Baird's conveyance of 
property was not made for fair consideration, (i.e., 
that the Trust did not pay equivalent value and prefers 
Mr. Baird and his family to legitimate creditors). 
(TSL's Original Memo, R. 102; see also TSL's Reply Memo, R. 293-
294.) At the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment, TSL stated that its action was based on just three 
grounds, none of which included a theory based on § 25-1-7 or 25-
1-8. (Transcript of proceedings, R. 664-665.) By attempting to 
raise this ground on appeal, TSL is trying to keep in motion a 
"merry-go-round" of litigation. 
TSL will doubtlessly reply to the foregoing by pointing to a 
statement in the trial court's "Order Re: Summary Judgment" that 
says, "Plaintiff claimed that the conveyance was in violation of 
the Fraudulent Conveyance Act in that allegedly:...(7) the 
conveyance into trust was actually fraudulent (intentionally)." 
(Add. 1-6.) Any reference to actual fraud in the Order is due to 
inadvertence, and does not change the fact that the issue has 
never been raised or argued by TSL in this case. Upon discovery 
of the error in the Order, Respondent immediately filed a motion 
with this court for leave to have the District Court amend its 
Order. That motion was denied by this Court. Nevertheless, the 
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statement in the Order is subject to review by this Court, which 
has before it all the pleadings and a full transcript of the 
hearing, and can therefore judge on its own the accuracy of the 
statement. The above statement is in error insofar as it implies 
that TSL ever claimed or argued, pursuant to §§ 25-1-7 or 25-1-8, 
that the conveyances to the trust should be set aside, and need 
not be accepted by this Court as correct. 
Although TSL argued that certain "badges of fraud" existed 
in this transaction, this argument was made only in the context 
of trying to shift the burden of proof of the required elements 
under the constructive fraud statute, U.C.A. § 25-1-4 (see Point 
V B, infra) , and in the context of trying to show lack of good 
faith under the "fair consideration element of § 25-1-4 (See 
Point III B.2, Supra.) TSL never made the "badges of fraud11 
argument in the context of an actual fraud theory under §5 25-1-7 
and 25-1-8. If TSL claims it did raise such a theory it should 
be required to point out and cite with specificity where in the 
record such arguments were made. This it has been unable to do 
on at least three prior occasions. (See Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition, pp 19-
22; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to 
Amend Order Re: Summary Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc (R. 559-620); 
Motion for Leave to Allow District Court to Correct Order; all on 
file herein). Accordingly, this Court should not consider on 
appeal TSL's theory based on §§ 25-1-7 or 25-1-8. 
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Furthermore, as discussed in Point III B.2, supra, 
respondents have shown that the alleged "badges of fraud" are not 
present in this case and that the transfer was made in good 
faith. Therefore the trial court could have found as a matter of 
law and undisputed fact that TSL could not meet its burden of 
showing, clearly and convincingly, that there was actual intent 
to defraud. 
TSL asserts that fraud issues should not be decided on 
summary judgment. In support, TSL cites two fraud cases where 
summary judgment was reversed on the basis of material issues of 
fact. However, this Court has frequently affirmed summary 
judgment in fraud cases where, as here, the undisputed 
affidavits, depositions, and other evidence showed no material 
issues of fact. See, e.g. , Clegcr v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 516 
P. 2d 348 (1973) (purchaser's own deposition refuted allegations 
of fraud); A & M Enterprise v. Hunziker, 25 Utah 2d 363, 482 P.2d 
700 (1971) (plaintiffs failed to file counter affidavits); 
Pioneer Finance and Thrift Co.v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443 P.2d 
389 (1968) (absence of evidence showing fraud); McDonald v. 
Breinholt, 21 Utah 2d 9, 934 P.2d 462 (1968) (same); Heathman v. 
Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962); Shayne v. 
Stanley & Sons, Inc.. 605 P.2d 775 (Utah 1975). 
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POINT V 
The District Court Did Not 
Commit Reversible Error by the 
Standards and Burdens of Proof It Imposed 
Regarding the standard and burden of proof governing this 
case, the district court held: 
[Pjlaintiff has a burden of supporting its contentions 
by clear and convincing evidence (burden) and the 
established facts show that plaintiff is unable to do 
so. (Order Re: Summary Judgment, R. 435, Add. 4) 
Contrary to Point IV of TSL's brief, the above statement is 
not in error. As to the proper standard of proof, this holding 
is essentially correct, and to the degree that it may be in 
error, such error is harmless. As to the burden of proof, this 
statement is entirely correct. 
A. Standard of Proof 
As discussed previously, TSL argued to the trial court, and 
now argues on appeal, that Baird's conveyance violates two 
statutes: (1) § 25-1-11, making void a trust for the use of the 
grantor, and (2) § 25-1-4, rendering constructively fraudulent a 
conveyance made without fair consideration while the transferor 
was insolvent. TSL argues for the first time on appeal a third 
ground, (3) § 25-1-7, rendering conveyances void for actual 
fraud. 
TSL concedes in its brief that the correct standard of proof 
for the latter two grounds is the "clear and convincing" 
standard. The more recent Utah cases so hold. Furniture 
Manufacturers Sales, Inc. v Deamer, 680 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 
43 
1984): Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 243, 519 P.2d 236, 239 (1974). 
The contrary Utah cases cited by TSL are older and, insofar as 
they require a different standard of proof, have apparently been 
overruled sub silentio by this Court. 
As to § 25-1-11, the grantor-trust statute, a clear and 
convincing standard is appropriate for the same reasons it is 
appropriate for § 25-1-4, the constructive fraud statute. 
Neither section of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act requires 
actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors; both 
sections are constructive fraud statutes. As discussed earlier, 
the purpose of § 25-1-11 is to prevent debtors from fraudulently 
transferring property out of the reach of creditors. Leach v. 
Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1975). Since both statutes 
are constructive fraud statutes, the same standard of proof 
should apply to both. 
Furthermore, even if the appropriate standard for § 25-1-11 
is not clear and convincing but preponderance of the evidence, 
any error committed by the trial court in applying the incorrect 
standard is harmless. It is well settled that "a judgment should 
not be reversed in the absence of error which is substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there would be a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result in the absence of such error." 
Arnovitz v. Telia, 495 P.2d 310, 312 (Utah 1972). See also Paull 
v. Zions First National Bank, 417 P.2d 759, 761 (Utah 1966); In 
Re Baxters Estate, 399 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1965). 
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In this case, there is no reasonable likelihood of a 
different result had a different standard been applied and the 
alleged error had not been committed. As discussed in Point 
II.A., supra, § 25-1-11 does not even apply to this case as a 
matter of law because by its very terms § 25-1-11 does not apply 
to real property. Furthermore, as discussed in Point II.B., 
supra, the question of whether the KOA Irrevocable Trust is "for 
the use of" Baird is not a close call. Under applicable law, the 
KOA Trust is very clearly for the benefit of Baird1s unsecured 
creditors and not for Baird's benefit, and is obviously not the 
type of trust contemplated by the grantor trust statute. Whether 
the trial court applied the clear and convincing standard, or a 
much lower standard of proof, the result on the grantor-trust 
issue would have been the same, i.e., there was no dispute as to 
any material fact and it was shown that TSL could not meet its 
burden (even if by preponderance) that the trust was invalid 
under § 25-1-11. Consequently, even if the trial court erred in 
applying the incorrect standard of proof to the grantor trust 
issue, such error was harmless. 
B. Burden of Proof 
TSL argues that the trial court erred by not shifting the 
burden once TSL made a prima facie showing of the elements under 
§ 25-1-4. This argument is without merit, for the following 
reasons. 
First, Utah law does not require such an elaborate burden 
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shifting mechanism under § 25-1-4 as TSL claims. The general 
rule, as stated in the recent case of Furniture Manufacturers 
Sales v. Deamer. 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984), is that plaintiff 
simply has the burden of proving that he was a creditor, that 
defendant was insolvent or would have been rendered insolvent by 
the transfer, and that the conveyance was made without fair 
consideration. "Where these burdens have* not been met, the case 
must be dismissed." 680 P. 2d at 400 n.10. As discussed 
previously in Point III, TSL failed to prove all three of these 
elements. 
TSL cites Brimhall v. Grow, 25 Utah 2d 298, 480 P.2d 731 
(1971) , for the proposition that somehow the burden of 
establishing these three elements can be shifted to the debtor. 
Brimhall is inapplicable because the quoted language in Brimhall 
expressly refers to § 25-1-8, not § 25-1-4. Furthermore, in 
Brimhall no consideration supported the transfer, while in this 
case the transfer was clearly supported by fair consideration. 
480 P.2d at 734. Finally, even if Brimhall was applicable to 
§ 25-1-4 cases, it has been overruled by Deamer, supra. 
A second reason why TSL's argument fails is that it has 
incorrectly attempted to import the "badges of fraud" concept 
from § 25-1-7 (actual intent to defraud), where it belongs, to § 
2 5-1-4, where it does not. The badges of fraud concept properly 
belongs with § 25-1-7 because of the difficulty of directly 
proving actual intent to defraud. Such proof is nearly always 
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circumstantial, and accordingly the courts have developed the 
badges of fraud concept to aid in determining just what 
circumstances will show actual fraud. As discussed above, TSL 
never raised or discussed "badges of fraud" in the context of 
§25-1-7. 
Section 25-1-4, on the other hand, is a constructive fraud 
section designed to obviate the problems of proving actual 
intent. Its three elements of creditor status, insolvency, and 
lack of fair consideration can be directly proven. Thus the 
badges of fraud concept has no place in proving § 25-1-4. 
To support its argument that the badges of fraud will shift 
the burden of proof under § 25-1-4, TSL cites a line of Utah 
Cases beginning with Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah 540, 15 P.2d 1051 
(1932), and followed by Zuniga v. Evans. 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513 
(1935); Lund v. Howell, 92 Utah 232, 67 P.2d 215 (1937); and 
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942). This line 
of cases suggested that under a certain combination of 
circumstances (transfer to near relative without fair 
consideration) the burden under § 25-1-4 is shifted to the 
transferee to show good faith of the transaction. 
A close reading of the Paxton cases shows that they are 
distinguishable for at least two reasons. First, the rule in 
Paxton was not applied to § 25-1-4 or another constructive intent 
statute; the language of the opinion suggests that the statute at 
issue involved actual intent as distinguished from intent 
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presumed by law. Second, the rule in Paxton was qualified in 
Zuniga v. Evans, supra, to be a rule of procedure, not a rule of 
evidence. In effect, it places the risk of going forward rather 
than the risk of persuasion on the defendants. 
Furthermore, the Paxton rule has been superseded by a longer 
and more recent line of cases.3 In this line of cases the burden 
is not placed on the defendant, but instead remains on the 
plaintiff to prove the elements of § 25-1-4. 
For a very complete and scholarly comparison of the Paxton 
cases to the cases cited in the foregoing footnote, this Court's 
attention is directed to the opinion of the Honorable Judge Ralph 
Mabey in In re Groomsf 13 B.R. 376, 379-84 (Bankr. Utah 1981), 
which is included in the Addendum, pages 99-107. 
Meyer v. General American Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977), 
cited by TSL, does not shift the burden at all. Its only 
reference to "indicia of fraud" is as additional support for the 
trial court's finding of lack of good faith. 
Qgden State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765 (1895), 
also cited by TSL, is a pre-Uniform Act case that is 
distinguishable for several reasons: it was concerned with 
3
 See Gust in v. Matthews, 25 Utah 168, 70 P. 402 (1902); 
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932); Williams v. 
Petersen, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935); Cardon v. Harper, 106 
Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99 (1944); Barker v. Dunham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 
342 P.2d 867 (1959); Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 
959 (1960); Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 
962 (1962); Meyer v. General American Corp., 564 P.2d 1094 (Utah 
1977); Road Runner, Inc. v. Merrill, 605 P.2d 776 (Utah 1980). 
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actual intent to defraud; the consideration there, under an 
estoppel by deed theory, was treated as nil; and it deals with 
services performed by minor children. Givan v. Lambeth, supra. 
demonstrates that services by adult children are valid 
consideration. 
Furthermore, in any event, the recognized badges of fraud 
are not present in this case, as discussed in Point IV.B.2, 
supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The law and undisputed facts show that TSL is not entitled 
to judgment under any of the theories presented to the trial 
court. Therefore, based on the foregoing, Respondent 
respectfully requests this Court affirm the ruling of the 
District Court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants 
and denying summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 1988. 
z>KJeLs5r<Z. 
Randall S.^Feil' 
Michael Ferrin 
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citations set forth herein are submitted to supplement the portions 
of Respondents1 Brief containing citations to the deposition of 
John Nelson Baird. The deposition of Mr. Baird was cited by 
respondents in their Brief under the belief that the deposition had 
been filed with the district court. However, respondents have 
since learned that the deposition of John Nelson Baird was never 
filed with the district court, and therefore cannot be considered 
part of the record on appeal. Consequently, respondents hereby 
supplement their Brief with appropriate citations to the record 
which support the statements previously supported only by citations 
to the deposition of John Nelson Baird. 
The Respondents1 Brief is hereby supplemented as follows: 
1. The first citation on page 3 of Respondents1 Brief is 
amended to read as follows: (Affidavit of John Nelson Baird, R. 
184, add. 26; Affidavit of Joy K. Baird, R. 265, add. 91, 92; 
Exhibit C to the KOA Irrevocable Trust Agreement, add. 17.). 
2. The second citation on page 3 of Respondents1 Brief, 
which citation follows the first full paragraph on page 3 is 
amended to read as follows: (Affidavit of John Nelson Baird, R. 
184, add. 33; Affidavits of John Knapp Baird, R. 244, add. 89, 90; 
David Lincoln Baird, R. 263, add. 84, 85.). 
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ihiici citation .. page J of Respondents1 br^i , ^...^ .a 
citation follovr the second fall paragraph on page 3 is amended to 
read a^ ^ " " o\ - ^ f f ^ a v N
 0f jolii! Nelson Bali"-:7 **• • . -• : 
2 3.) 
-,v. jj.i.^ c v,.., on page 4 of Respondents 1 Brief is 
amended tc read as follovs (Affidavit of John Nelson -^- i rn rind 
Exhih : ? ' -eretc, " 19 .il\ ~r • ; . 
o second ntatio: . paye : kesp \dent~ Bilef, 
which citatior 4 l , ^ v tl •. L i rst full .jiaph on page 4 is 
amended to rea.; <A t- ;ioui (Exhibit C to KOA Irrevocable Trust, 
R. 221, ad- ; • !»f ^ J ' f^ John Knapr> Baird, 34-40 ) . 
6. Tij^ . iij.ci v. on page r> or Respondents1 Brief is 
amended to read as fo (Exhibit C to KOA Irrevocable Trust, 
R. 221, a-" ; • of John I .app Baird, 34-40, 44-48; 
Affidavj t * ..,,ii ht'.t * .-• - d and Exhibits C and D thereto, R. 
2 0 3 - 2 0 9 , „ -:' -•=".! * 
7. me i . ? . u n citation on page 6 of Respondents' Brief, 
whicL citation toljrws the first full paragraph on page 6 is 
amended tc read as follows: (Affidavit of John Knapp Baird 
Regard!^ ••- *---,*. 
iirst citation on page 30 of Respondents1 Brief, 
"wi lie ii iallows the sentence "for two years after the challenged 
conveyance the Meadowview lessee made the lease payments to Baird, 
who in turn endorsed the payment checks over to the KOA Irrevocabl e 
Trust and sent them to the Trustee11, is amended to read as follows: 
(Affidavit of John Knapp Baird Regardi ng T^ 1 '^- Accounting). 
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